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Toward a Limited Right of Publicity: An
Argument for the Convergence of the
Right of Publicity, Unfair Competition
and Trademark Law
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau*
The right of publicity—the most recently developed type of
intellectual property—allows a person to control commercial use
of his or her identity. The scope of the right has expanded
significantly since its inception because many courts and
commentators have misinterpreted it, viewing it as a pure property
right justified by a labor or unjust enrichment theory. Rather, this
article contends that it should be evaluated in light of the
utilitarian justification for intellectual property law. Rewarding
people by allowing them to monetize their public persona is not the
goal of the right of publicity. The goal should be to incentivize
individuals to engage in creative endeavors for the benefit of the
public. Accordingly, a right of publicity action should only be
available if commercial use of an individual’s persona will result
in the likelihood that consumers will be misled into thinking the
individual endorsed or approved of the use of his or her identity.
However, such confusion-based conduct is already actionable
under trademark and unfair competition law. Therefore, I argue
that any use of a person’s persona that creates an association with
the person but does not create a likelihood that consumers will
think the person endorsed or approved of the commercial use
should only be actionable if the person is famous. This is
consistent with trademark dilution law, which limits associationbased trademark actions to famous trademarks. This approach
places the right of publicity within the domain of intellectual
property law and preserves the existing balances between
132

C03_BECKERMAN-RODAU (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

12/9/2012 2:13 PM

133

protecting property rights, preventing free riding, and preserving
robust free speech rights.
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INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity is a relatively new body of law designed
to protect the legal right of a person to control commercial use of
his or her identity.1 It is viewed by courts and commentators as
*
Professor of Law & Co-Director, Intellectual Property Law Concentration, Suffolk
University Law School, Boston, Massachusetts. J.D., 1981, Western New England
University School of Law; L.L.M., 1986, Temple University School of Law; B.S.
(Engineering), 1976, Hofstra University.
Email: arodau@suffolk.edu; website:
http://lawprofessor.org. Special thanks to Matthew Traister (Suffolk University Law
School Class of 2012) for research assistance.
1
See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The right
of publicity is an intellectual property right of recent origin which has been defined as the
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her
identity.”); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir.
1983) (“The theory of the right is that a celebrity’s identity can be valuable in the
promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that may be protected from the
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part of the body of intellectual property law, which includes patent,
copyright, trademark, and trade secrets law.2
Over the last few decades, intellectual property law has seen a
significant expansion of protected subject matter.3 More recently,
however, legislative and judicial efforts have signaled—at least in
unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity.”); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 at 3 (2012 ed.).
2
See ROGER SCHECHTER & JOHN THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 1.1 at 1 (2003); MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §
1:3 at 3. Patent law protects particular embodiments of certain new inventions. See 35
U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Copyright law, codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332, protects the
form of expression of aesthetic creations such as literary and artistic works. See
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra. Trademark law, which protects the mental association
created in the mind of consumers when a word, phrase, device, or other commercial
symbol is used to trigger an association with a product or service, is a composite of state
common law, state statutory law, and federal statutory law. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141
(2012) (Federal Trademark statute called the Lanham Act); PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R.
ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 167
(6th ed. 2008). See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1329.54–1329.67 (state trademark statute);
see also Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942) (trademarks are used “to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears”). Trade secrets law
protects commercial information or know-how, which provides a competitive
marketplace advantage as a consequence of being maintained as a secret. Trade secrets
law has common law origins. Schechter & Thomas, supra, § 24.1 at 529. Today most
states have adopted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (1985), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=130067 (last visited October 15, 2012).
For information on the states that have adopted the Act see
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited June 1,
2012). Additionally, a federal trade secrets law called the Economic Espionage Act
allows the government to bring civil and criminal actions for trade secret
misappropriation. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (“A trade secret is any information that can be used in the
operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to
afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”); see also Uniform Trade
Secrets Act § 1(4) (1985), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/
en/text.jsp?file_id=130067 (last visited October 15, 2012), which states:
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
3
See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual Property
Rights: Subject Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 36, 39 (2010).
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the area of patent law—a desire to restrict or limit the domain of
protectable intellectual property.4
Similarly, early right of
publicity cases greatly expanded the scope of the right,5 while
some recent cases have reversed this trend.6
This Article will briefly review the history and development of
the right of publicity. It will examine the underlying justifications
for this right because its scope can best be determined in light of its
reasons for existence. Furthermore, this Article will argue that
many courts and commentators have misinterpreted the right of
publicity by viewing it as a pure property right justified by a labor
or unjust enrichment theory. Instead, I argue that the right of
publicity should be evaluated in light of the utilitarian justification
for intellectual property law generally. This Article will argue that
the right is a species of intellectual property law rather than a pure
freestanding property right. As such, rewarding people by
allowing them to monetize their public persona is not the right of
publicity’s aim. Rather, the aim should be to incentivize
individuals to engage in creative endeavors for public benefit,
echoing the broader utilitarian goals of intellectual property law.7
Also, because of the communicative aspects involved, the right
must be balanced against First Amendment free speech
requirements—just as trademark and copyright rights are
balanced.8 Accordingly, this Article will argue that the right of
publicity provides excessive and unwarranted legal protection
especially in light of the expansive protection provided by
trademark and unfair competition law today. This supports an
argument for greatly restricting the right of publicity.

4

See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1297 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010).
5
See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–98 (9th Cir.
1992); Carson, 698 F.2d at 835.
6
See, e.g., C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ome courts have indicated that the
right of publicity is intended to promote only economic interests and that noneconomic
interests are more directly served by so-called rights of privacy. . . . We see merit in this
approach.”).
7
See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 3, at 47–48.
8
See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976
(10th Cir. 1996).
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Violations of the right of publicity based merely on a showing
that an unauthorized third party used a person’s identity in a
commercial context should not be actionable. Such associationbased uses should be within the public domain. In contrast, if the
use of someone’s persona will result in a likelihood that consumers
will be confused with regard to whether the person endorsed or
approved of the use of his or her identity in the commercial
activity, then it should be actionable. Reliance on a likelihood of
confusion standard is consistent with existing trademark and unfair
competition law,9 and it reflects the careful balance developed
between protecting intellectual property rights and conflicts with
the First Amendment when communicative conduct is involved.10
The expanded nature of modern trademark and unfair
competition law can provide adequate relief for confusion-based
actions for the use of someone’s persona. The additional
protection for mere association-based use of a person’s identity is
generally not justified in light of the utilitarian objectives of
intellectual property law and First Amendment concerns.
Analogous to existing trademark dilution law, I propose that a
person should only be able to assert a right of publicity action
based on an association-use of his or her persona if the person is
famous. The article concludes with a proposed framework which
places the right of publicity within the domain of intellectual
property law. This encourages in the right of publicity context the
striking of the same balance utilized in intellectually property law
generally—a balance between protecting property rights,
preventing free riding, and preserving a robust public domain for
speech.
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S DEVELOPMENT
The right of publicity is rooted in privacy law.11 Aspects of a
legal right to protect individual privacy can be traced back to
ancient Talmudic and Roman law.12 Nevertheless, as late as 1890
9
10
11
12

See Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:7 at 9.
See id. § 1:9 at 13.
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a right of privacy was unrecognized under English or United States
common law.13 In 1890, Warren and Brandeis published their
famous article, which argued in favor of adopting a common law
right of privacy.14 Initially, some courts rejected adopting such a
right15 while other courts favored the idea.16 Nevertheless, privacy
law continued to be an amorphous area of law until an influential
law review article authored by William Prosser in 1960
categorized privacy law into four distinct torts: intrusion, public
disclosure of private facts, false light in the public eye, and
appropriation.17
Intrusion was defined as an invasion of a person’s privacy that
a reasonable person would find objectionable or offensive.18 For
example, surreptitiously peering into a private residence to take a
picture of a person would be an intrusion,19 but taking a picture of
that person in a public area would be permissible.20
Public disclosure of private facts, in contrast to intrusion, was
designed to protect an individual’s reputation.21 Prosser saw it as
an extension of defamation law.22 But unlike defamation law—
where the truthfulness of publicly disseminated information was a
complete defense—the truth or falsity of the facts was not the
controlling issue of the right of privacy.23 Public disclosure of
13

W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER
§ 117, at 849 (5th ed. 1984).
14
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
196 (1890).
15
See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 556 (N.Y. Ct. of
App. 1902) (“An examination of the authorities leads us to the conclusion that the socalled ‘right of privacy’ has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence, and,
as we view it, the doctrine cannot now be incorporated without doing violence to settled
principles of law by which the profession and the public have long been guided.”).
16
See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 73 (Ga. 1905) (“[A]
violation of the right of privacy is a direct invasion of a legal right of the individual.”).
17
William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
18
Id. at 390–91; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:20 at 33–34.
19
See Prosser, supra note 17, at 392.
20
Id. at 391.
21
See id. at 398.
22
Id.
23
See id.; MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:22 at 37 (observing that falsity of disclosed
information is an element of a defamation action but not an element of a right of privacy
action based on public disclosure of private facts).
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
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truthful facts that were private in nature could be actionable if a
reasonable person would find such disclosure objectionable.24 For
example, public disclosure of a person’s tax returns, which are
confidential records, could be actionable.25 In contrast, public
disclosure of a person’s birth date or admission to the bar would
not be actionable since that is public information.26
False light in the public eye, unlike public disclosure of private
facts, involves publication of information that may injure a
person’s reputation by implying something that is untrue.27 Like
the other privacy actions discussed above, the offense must consist
of something an ordinarily reasonable person would find
objectionable under the circumstances.28 For example, using the
picture of a person to illustrate an article on illegal criminal
activity when the person pictured has no involvement in the
activity is actionable because it can falsely imply to the public that
the person is involved in such activity.29 Prosser viewed a false
light action as overlapping and including defamation.30 However,
his view was that such an action could also cover conduct beyond
the narrow scope of defamation.31
Appropriation was defined as the unauthorized use of a
person’s name or likeness.32 For example, if the picture of a
celebrity is used without permission to advertise a product or
service, that celebrity may have an action for appropriation.33

24

See Prosser, supra note 17, at 396; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:21 at 36–
37 (observing that public disclosure of private facts provides an action for public
disclosure of private information that is embarrassing to a person of ordinary
sensibilities).
25
Prosser, supra note 117, at 395–96.
26
Id. at 396.
27
Id. at 400.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 399.
30
Id. at 400; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:22 at 37 (nebulous areas of law
that extends defamation law).
31
Prosser, supra note 17, at 400–01. But see MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:22 at 38
(noting it is not clear the U.S. Supreme Court sees a distinction between defamation and
false light actions).
32
Prosser, supra note 17, at 401–02; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:23 at 39
(most appropriation cases involve commercial use of a person’s name or picture).
33
Prosser, supra note 17, at 401–02.
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Prosser noted that at least one court had called a right of privacy
action by appropriation a right of publicity action.34 He also
suggested that this action was really an economic right that
allowed a person to control the use of his name or likeness in the
commercial context.35 In contrast, intrusion, public disclosure of
private facts, and false light involve actions to protect privacy and
reputation.36
The appropriation action identified by Prosser appears to have
been the basis for the right of publicity,37 initially enunciated by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
1953.38 Subsequently, a 1954 law review article by Melville
Nimmer provided a theoretical framework for differentiating the
right of privacy from the right of publicity.39 Other commentators
also asserted the notion that right of privacy actions based on
intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, and false light were
distinguishable from a right of privacy action based on
appropriation.40 Subsequent case law, including one United States
Supreme Court decision, recognized the right of publicity as a
valid state law cause of action.41
Today, the right of privacy and the right of publicity have
become separate causes of action despite having a common
ancestor.42 The right of privacy protects the right to be left alone
34

Id. at 406–07.
Id. at 406.
36
Id.
37
See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:23 at 39.
38
See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953).
39
See generally Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203, 204–10 (1954) (discussing the inadequacies of privacy law in protecting the
values of publicity).
40
See, e.g., 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.7, at
689–91 (1956) (asserting that appropriation actions involve financial considerations
unlike typical privacy actions which involve emotional distress, humiliation, and
interference with personal dignity).
41
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 567 (1977).
42
In Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir.
1983), the court stated that right of privacy actions based on intrusion, public disclosure
of private facts, and false light generally protect the right to be left alone while the
appropriation action—which it called the right of publicity—protects a celebrity’s
monetary interest in exploiting his or her identity. “Thus, the right of privacy and the
35
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and the right to be free from third parties obtaining and publicizing
personal information.43 Remedies for privacy violations are
tortious in nature and focus on compensation for resulting mental
and emotional injuries as well as injury to reputation.44 In contrast,
an appropriation action has been generally renamed a right of
publicity action,45 which protects intangible property.46 Remedies
for violation of the right of publicity are typically property-based
remedies that focus on recovering the economic value of a persona
when, for example, it is used without consent in a commercial
context—such as enhancing or promoting the sale of a product by
associating it with a well-known person.47 Although right of
publicity actions are often deemed tort actions, the tortious conduct
is interference with a person’s property per se.48
By the 1980s, the recognition of a property-based right of
publicity action was well accepted.49 As a result, the majority of
right of publicity protect fundamentally different interests and must be analyzed
separately.” Id. See also State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Crowell, 733
S.W.2d 89, 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (courts view right of publicity as distinct from right
of privacy).
43
See Carson, 698 F.2d at 834.
44
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 11:26–27 at 736–37 (describing damages based on
resulting mental distress flowing from privacy violation).
45
Carson, 698 F.2d at 834.
46
See e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & MICHAEL
H. SCHILL, PROPERTY 66 (7th ed. 2010) (explaining that the right of publicity is a
property interest that includes typical attributes of property such as right to both inter
vivos and testamentary transfers); see also Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 459
(6th Cir. 2003) (holding right of publicity a type of property); Herman Miller, Inc. v.
Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 325 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding right of
publicity is a property right that can extend beyond death); Hart v. Elec. Arts Inc., 808 F.
Supp. 2d 757, 773 (D.N.J. 2011) (noting right of publicity is property right); Crowell, 733
S.W.2d at 97 (holding right of publicity is intangible personal property); Marshall
Leaffer, The Right of Publicity: A Comparative Perspective, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1357, 1361,
1367 (2007) (treating right of publicity treated as pure property right).
47
See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976
(10th Cir. 1996) (“Publicity rights . . . are meant to protect against the loss of financial
gain, not mental anguish.”). See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 11:30–31 at
751–52 (discussing that damages for violation of the right of publicity are based on
commercial injury, not mental or emotional injury).
48
See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3 at 3 (explaining that infringement of right of
publicity is a tort action based on interfering with a property right).
49
See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:31 at 64 (“By the mid 1980s, the initial phase of
questioning what the right of publicity was and why it should exist passed largely into
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states recognize the right of publicity today via case law, statute or
both, although the scope and duration of the right varies from state
to state.50 The development of the law then shifted to defining the
scope of the right of publicity.51
II. THE CHANGING SCOPE OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Some early decisions broadly construed the right of publicity52
while some more recent decisions have significantly narrowed the
scope.53 Arguably, this reflects the typical development of a new
area of law. A new right slowly expands until it creates
unintended consequences such as invading the scope of a
competing right.54 Then, one right preempts the conflicting right
or judicial theories must be developed to balance the competing
rights so they can coexist.55
history.”); id. § 10:7 at 506–10 (stating that courts uniformly hold that right of publicity
is a property interest).
50
See id. §§ 6:1–8 at 854–72 (providing detailed state-by-state overview of the right of
publicity); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(5) (West 2012) (stating Florida right of
publicity statute provides for rights to last forty years after death); IND. CODE ANN. § 3236-1-8 (West 2012) (stating Indiana right of publicity statute provides for rights to last
one hundred years after death); DONALD S. CHISUM, TYLER T. OCHOA, SHUBHA GNOSH &
MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 6G [6], at 766 (2d ed.
2011) (asserting New York and Wisconsin do not recognize any postmortem right of
publicity). See generally MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER, INC., MEDIA PRIVACY AND
RELATED LAW 2008–09 (2008) (providing detailed state-by-state overview of both the
right of privacy and the right of publicity).
51
See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:31 at 64.
52
See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992)
(reasoning that the common law right of publicity is not confined to the appropriation of
name or likeness); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir.
1983) (“[A] celebrity’s legal right of publicity is invaded whenever his identity is
intentionally appropriated for commercial purposes.”).
53
See, e.g., C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding “CBC’s first amendment rights
in offering its fantasy baseball products supersede the players’ rights of publicity”).
54
See e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164–69 (1995) (taking
an expansive view of what could be registered as a trademark under federal law, the court
created the potential for trademark rights to unfairly interfere with competition).
55
See id. (expanding the functionality doctrine to enable a court to deny trademark
rights to something serving a trademark function if it created a non-reputational
marketplace advantage which could interfere with competition); see, e.g., Traffix Devices
v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 32–33 (2001) (restating the Court’s holding in Qualitex
by distinguishing between cases of aesthetic functionality rather than functional design).
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A. Broad Interpretation of the Scope of the Right of Publicity
In Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,56 the wellknown entertainer Johnny Carson sued a Michigan portable toilet
company whose corporate name was Here’s Johnny Portable
Toilets, Inc.57 The company’s founder adopted the name knowing
it was the slogan used to introduce Mr. Carson on his television
program The Tonight Show.58 He combined the phrase with a
second phrase—“The World’s Foremost Commodian”—to create
“a good play on a phrase.”59 Mr. Carson, however, objected to the
business of renting or selling portable toilets under the name
“Here’s Johnny.”60 He sued the company, asserting, among other
things, unfair competition, trademark infringement, and violation
of his right of publicity.61 The trial court dismissed all the
claims.62 It held that although the founder intended to free ride on
the popularity of the phrase, he did not intend to deceive the
public.63 Additionally, the court found that the evidence failed to
demonstrate any likelihood of consumer confusion from the use of
the phrase to sell portable toilets.64 In light of the absence of a
likelihood of confusion, the court found the unfair competition
claim invalid.65 Likewise, the court dismissed the right of
publicity claim holding that it only applied to the use of a person’s
name or likeness and that neither was being used to sell portable
toilets.66 On appeal the trial court’s dismissal of the unfair
competition claim was upheld in light of Mr. Carson’s failure to
56

698 F.2d 831.
Id. at 833.
58
See id. at 833, 836 (asserting that President and owner of the company admitted that
the phrase “Here’s Johnny” would not have been adopted to sell portable toilets if public
didn’t associate phrase with Mr. Carson).
59
Id. at 833.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 834.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 833. Although the Carson court did not specifically discuss the trademark
infringement claim, the absence of any likelihood of confusion would negate a trademark
infringement claim as well as an unfair competition claim. See GMC v. Keystone Auto.
Indus., 453 F.3d 351, 354 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that test for trademark infringement
and for unfair competition is likelihood of consumer confusion).
66
Carson, 698 F.2d at 833.
57
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show likelihood of confusion.67 However, the dismissal of the
right of publicity claim was vacated and remanded68 based on the
appellate court’s holding that Mr. Carson’s right of publicity was
violated.69
The appellate court determined that the right of publicity was
not limited to the use of a person’s name or likeness,70 concluding
that anything intentionally used in a commercial context that
creates an association with a celebrity can amount to commercial
exploitation of the celebrity’s identity.71 In Carson, the appellate
court determined that use of the phrase “Here’s Johnny” in selling
portable toilets could support Mr. Carson’s claim because it creates
an association with him in the minds of consumers even though a
consumer would not think he endorsed or was affiliated with the
portable toilet business.72 The decision therefore distinguishes
between commercial use that merely creates an association-based
relationship with a celebrity and commercial use that creates a
confusion-based relationship with a celebrity, which may cause
consumers to incorrectly believe the celebrity endorsed or is
affiliated with the product.73 This distinction is clearly illustrated
by Carson when the appellate court held that a right of publicity
claim was viable74 despite an express finding that consumers were
unlikely to believe Mr. Carson endorsed or had any connection
with the portable toilet business.75

67

Id. at 834.
Id. at 837.
69
Id. at 836.
70
Id. at 835.
71
See generally id. at 835 (“If the celebrity’s identity is commercially exploited, there
has been an invasion of his right [of publicity] whether or not his ‘name or likeness’ is
used.”).
72
Id. at 836.
73
See generally Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting
that false advertising action requires a likelihood of consumer confusion, but a right of
publicity claim does not require any likelihood of consumer confusion).
74
Carson, 698 F.2d at 836.
75
See id. at 834. See generally Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1212
(C.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that unfair competition action requires likelihood of consumer
confusion, but right of publicity action does not require any likelihood of confusion).
68
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Nine years later, the Ninth Circuit issued an equally broad
decision in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.76 This
case involved an advertisement for Samsung video cassette
recorders.77 The advertisement showed a robot dressed up in a
wig, gown, and jewelry on a television set that was similar to that
of the game show Wheel of Fortune.78 Although the robot did not
use the face or likeness of the show’s host, Vanna White,79 the
overall appearance of the robot, including how it was posed and its
location on what appears to be the show’s set, was intentionally
designed to make viewers think of Ms. White.80 Ms. White sued
Samsung, asserting violation of the California right of publicity
statute,81 the California common law right of publicity,82 and the
federal unfair competition statute.83
The trial court granted summary judgment against Ms. White
on all causes of action.84 The appellate court affirmed the trial
court with regard to the California statutory right of publicity
action85 because the statute only applies if specific characteristics,
such as name or likeness, are used.86 Also, the district and
appellate courts agreed that neither Ms. White’s name nor her
likeness were used in the Samsung advertisement.87 The appellate
court reversed the trial court with regard to the common law right
of publicity action88 after concluding that, unlike the statutory
cause of action, the common law action was not limited to
appropriation of specific celebrity characteristics such as a name or
likeness.89 With regard to the unfair competition cause of action,

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).
Id. at 1396.
Id.
Id. at 1397.
Id. at 1396.
Id. at 1395. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2012).
White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
Id. at 1395. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
White, 971 F.2d at 1396–97.
Id. at 1397.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1399.
Id. at 1397.
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the court reversed and remanded to the trial court.90 This action
turns on whether the advertisement created a likelihood of
consumer confusion,91 which was an issue of fact to be determined
by a jury.92 This broad view of the common law right of publicity
is consistent with the result in the Carson case. Additionally, the
independent treatment of the common law right of publicity action
and the unfair competition action means the White court made the
same distinction the Carson court made between an associationbased commercial use of a celebrity’s persona and a confusionbased commercial use.
B. Narrowing Interpretation of the Scope of the Right of Publicity
Several grounds for narrowing or limiting the right of publicity
have been asserted in court. These include preemption based on
federal copyright law93 and interference with First Amendment
considerations.94 Preemption arguments have generally been
unsuccessful95 but some courts have found that First Amendment
considerations provide fertile ground for restraining the right of
publicity.96

90

Id. at 1401.
Id. at 1399–1400.
92
Id. at 1401.
93
17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
94
See generally ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003)
(“There is an inherent tension between the right of publicity and the right of freedom of
expression under the First Amendment.”).
95
See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:50 at 832 (stating how the majority rule is that
federal copyright law does not preempt state-based right of publicity); Jennifer E.
Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199,
225–26 (2002) (nothing that few courts have found right of publicity preempted by
copyright law); see, e.g., Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (D.
Minn. 2010) (rejecting argument that federal copyright law preempted state right of
publicity action). But see Ahn v. Midway Mfg. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1134, 1138 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (holding federal copyright law does preempt right of publicity action).
96
See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976
(10th Cir. 1996) (finding that First Amendment considerations outweighed right of
publicity rights). See generally Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 769 (D.N.J.
2011) (describing how courts use a balancing test to determine if First Amendment free
speech rights limit a right of publicity action).
91
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In the video game market, information about actual athletes has
been incorporated into games without the athlete’s consent.97
Electronic Arts, Inc. produces a series of video games based on
college football, which allows users to simulate collegiate football
games.98 One of the players depicted in the game asserted that
virtual players in the game utilized characteristics of actual players
in order to achieve realism.99 The player sued for violation of his
right to publicity.100 In response to a motion to dismiss,101 the trial
court held that the First Amendment did not bar a right of publicity
action.102
In another video game case, C.B.C. Distribution and
Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P.,103 an Internet-based fantasy baseball league operated a forprofit business that used the names, biographical data, and
performance statistics of actual Major League Baseball players
without permission.104 The court concluded that the baseball
players depicted in the game met the prima facie elements
necessary to sustain a right of publicity action.105 However, the
court then held that those rights were superseded by the First
Amendment.106 Despite reliance on the First Amendment, the
court’s reasoning largely focused on an analysis of the underlying
purposes or justifications for the existence of the right of
publicity.107 The court noted that the justifications include
97
Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10719, at *7
(N.D. Cal. 2010).
98
Id. at *6.
99
Id.
100
Id. at *7–8.
101
Id. at *5.
102
Id. at *12. See also Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (D.
Minn. 2010) (holding, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the right of publicity
action by football players included in NFL promotional videos was not outweighed by
First Amendment). However, in Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 794
(D.N.J. 2011), after the court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the interaction of the
right of publicity and the First Amendment, the court found that the First Amendment
trumped the right of publicity with regard to the same video game at issue in Keller.
103
505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
104
See id. at 820.
105
Id. at 822–23.
106
Id. at 823.
107
Id. at 824.
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allowing an individual to gain the economic benefit of his or her
endeavors, incentivizing a person’s productive activities,
protecting natural rights, and rewarding celebrity labor.108 The
court then determined that none of these justifications would be
interfered with by denying a right of publicity action in this case
because Major League Baseball players are already well paid and
can earn substantial additional income via sponsorship agreements
and endorsements.109 This view of the right to publicity was also
discussed in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Association,110 where the court stated that most celebrities with
commercially valuable identities are well compensated for the
activities that gave rise to their fame.111 Hence, according to that
court, the right of publicity is not necessary to induce people to
engage in activities leading to fame and public notoriety.112
C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. and Cardtoons held
that First Amendment considerations outweighed right to publicity
actions, with Cardtoons in particular taking a critical view of the
utilitarian justifications for a right to publicity action.113 This may
represent a judicial trend away from the broad application of the
right of publicity, such as in the Carson and White cases, in favor
of narrowing application of the right.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Once the law designates something as property, the traditional
“bundle of rights” attaches to that property.114 Those rights
typically include the right to exclude, the right to possess, the right
to use, and the right to transfer.115 However, the threshold question
108

Id.
Id.
110
95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
111
Id. at 973–74.
112
Id. at 974.
113
See id. at 971–72; C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc., 505 F.3d at 823.
114
See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278–79 (2002) (noting that state law
determines “which sticks are in a person’s bundle”).
115
See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (“[O]ne of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property—the
right to exclude others.”); JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 25–26 (2d ed. 2012); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ.
109
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is whether to designate something as property in the first place.
Under U.S. law this is usually a policy-based determination.116
Therefore, it is imperative that the relevant underlying rationales or
policy objectives be carefully examined. Legal rights typically do
not exist in a vacuum. They exist to further both general117 and
specific rationales.118 Additionally, the unintended consequences
or externalities that result from any legal right create collisions
with competing rights.119 Therefore, the rationales for the right of
publicity must be critically explored to ascertain if the right
furthers or satisfies the justifications advanced for it, and to
determine how to treat competing policies.
A. Labor Theory & Unjust Enrichment Justifications
Allowing someone to keep the fruits of their efforts is a
viscerally compelling justification for allowing a person—

of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 165 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (describing bundle of
rights as including rights to possess, to use, to exclude and to dispose of property).
116
Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 165 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (“For a variety of policy reasons, the
law limits or even forbids the exercise of certain rights over certain forms of property.”);
see also SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 115, at 1–8 (discussing various different
theories used to justify existence of property law). See generally DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
supra note 46, at 50 (noting that utilitarian theory is dominant view of property today).
117
State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human
values.”); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10–13 (1972) (“[T]he legal
protection of property rights has an important economic function: to create incentives to
use resources efficiently.”).
118
See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)
(“[T]he ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into
the public domain through disclosure.”); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g,
Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that trademarks identify goods and
services to consumers); Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21
HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 69 (1997) (arguing that intellectual property laws are based on
policy that granting property rights to authors and inventors maximizes incentives to
pursue creative endeavors).
119
See generally Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 (“The Patent Clause [U.S. CONST. art
I, § 8, cl. 8] . . . reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in
the ‘Progress of Science and the useful Arts.’”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON
COPYRIGHT § 1.14, at 1:41–1:42 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing balance between providing
enough rights to incentivize creators with maximizing public benefit from such creations
in context of copyright law); HOWARD C. ANAWALT, IDEA RIGHTS: A GUIDE TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9 (2011) (noting conflict between intellectual property rights
and the benefits of competition and the free flow of information).
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especially a celebrity—to control the commercial use of his or her
persona.120 The main reason the name or likeness of a celebrity is
used in a commercial context is to gain an economic advantage
from the association with a celebrity.121 For example, famous
sports personalities are used to sell products because the use of
such a person to pitch a product to the public can positively affect
the public’s perception of the product, which can translate into
increased sales.122 However, it is typically the celebrity that
invested the time and effort into becoming well known, so it can be
argued that the advertiser should pay for using that celebrity
status.123 It can be further argued that celebrity status is merely a
raw material used by an advertiser to sell a product, much like a
musician uses an instrument created by a third party to make
music. Even though the musician may create music that has
independent economic value, he or she must still pay the person
who created the musical instrument for the time and effort utilized
to make the instrument.

120

Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 975 (10th
Cir. 1996). See generally Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831,
835 (6th Cir. 1983) (“The theory of the right [of publicity] is that a celebrity’s identity
can be valuable in the promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that may be
protected from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity.”).
121
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:31 at 47–49 (discussing empirical evidence that
shows celebrity product endorsement can alter consumer perception of a product); see
also Leah W. Feinman, Celebrity Endorsements in Non-Traditional Advertising: How the
FTC Regulations Fail to Keep Up with the Kardashians, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 101 (2011) (“Celebrity endorsements can improve brand
recognition and recall . . . .”); Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Roobina Ohanian, Recent Trends
in the Law of Endorsement Advertising: Infomercials, Celebrity Endorsers and
Nontraditional Defendants in Deceptive Advertising Cases, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 650
(1991) (describing how celebrity endorsements give credibility to products). See
generally C. ROBERT CLARK & IGNATIUS J. HORSTMANN, A MODEL OF ADVERTISING
FORMAT COMPETITION: ON THE USE OF CELEBRITIES IN ADS (2009), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1333208 (last visited October 16, 2012) (discussing value
of celebrity endorsements in advertising).
122
The importance of endorsements by sports figures has reached the point where many
top athletes earn far more from endorsements than from playing sports. See Laura Lee
Stapleton & Matt McMurphy, The Professional Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 10 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 23, 23 (1999).
123
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974–75.

C03_BECKERMAN-RODAU (DO NOT DELETE)

150

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

12/9/2012 2:13 PM

[Vol. 23:132

Basic fairness is another theory that has been asserted for
treating the value of a person’s persona as a type of property.124
Arguably, fairness should support applying the property label to a
celebrity’s identity because he or she invested the time and effort
in creating its economic value.125 Therefore, unauthorized third
party use would amount to the third party free riding on the
economic value of the celebrity’s efforts without paying for what is
used. An unjust enrichment theory would provide legal support for
an action based on unfairness.126
Despite the appeal of a labor theory and an unjust enrichment
theory, property rights are often subject to uncompensated
limitations based on the public interest.127 Resale restrictions
apply to food, firearms, pharmaceuticals, alcoholic beverages, and
flammable materials.128 Similarly, real property rights can be
subject to uncompensated limitations.129 For example, zoning law,
nuisance law, historic preservation laws, and endangered species
laws can limit or restrict many potential uses of real property with
significant negative economic effects.130 Intellectual property
rights are also subject to limitations.131 The fair use doctrine
immunizes certain activities from copyright infringement.132 The
use of valuable trademarks in comparative advertising133 or news
124

See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:2 at 88–94 (discussing fairness as a
justification for the right of publicity in the context of a natural rights theory).
125
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975 (“People deserve the right to control and profit from the
commercial value of their identities because, quite simply, they’ve earned it.”). See
generally MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:2 at 88–94 (discussing fairness as a justification
for the right of publicity in the context of a natural rights theory).
126
See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977)
(finding that unjust enrichment is rationale for right of publicity); Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at
976 (noting that one justification for right of publicity is prevention of unjust
enrichment); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (noting
that right of publicity prevents unjust enrichment).
127
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 165–66 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
128
Id. at 165 n.7 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
129
Id. at 165–66.
130
Id. at 165 n.6.
131
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970–71 (discussing limitations placed on intellectual property
rights with regards to parody, criticism, and comment).
132
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
133
“It is well settled that the use of a trademark in a truthful comparative advertisement
to refer to another company is entirely permissible.” SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note
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reporting134 is not actionable by the trademark owner. Likewise,
property rights based on the right of publicity should also be
subject to appropriate policy based restrictions like other forms of
property.
B. Utilitarian Justification
Today, commentators135 and courts136 view the right of
publicity as a species of intellectual property law. Accordingly, it
makes sense to apply the underlying justification for intellectual
property law to the right of publicity. Intellectual property law,
like property law generally, is typically justified under a utilitarian
theory.137 The underlying policy justification for intellectual
property law is a desire to benefit society generally by encouraging
creativity and innovation in its many forms.138 The granting of
property rights is not the ultimate goal. Instead, granting such
rights is viewed as a method of incentivizing individuals and
enterprises to spend time, money, and effort on creative and
innovative endeavors that ultimately enrich the public.139 Hence,
granting property rights would be inconsistent with this

2, § 31.2.2 at 743; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (excluding use of
trademark in comparative advertising as actionable for trademark dilution).
134
CRAIG ALLEN NARD, MICHAEL J. MADISON, MARK P. MCKENNA & DAVID W.
BARNES, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1115 (3d ed. 2011); see also 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(3)(B) (excluding use of trademark in news reporting as actionable for trademark
dilution). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006) (codifying fair use defense to
trademark infringement).
135
See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3 at 3; SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 2,
§ 1.1 at 1.
136
See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003); see
also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (noting that the
goal of right of publicity action is closely analogous to the purpose of patent and
copyright law, which is to encourage creativity by allowing person to economically
benefit from his or her endeavors).
137
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 46, at 50 (utilitarian theory is dominant view of
property); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 531, 542 (2005) (noting most scholars rely on a utilitarian property theory); see also
Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 65
(1997) (intellectual property law based on utilitarian policy that granting property rights
to inventors and authors maximizes incentives to engage in creative activities).
138
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
139
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th
Cir. 1996); see also Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576–77.
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justification if it did not incentivize action that furthered the
ultimate goal of providing societal benefits.140
The determinative question then becomes whether the right of
publicity is necessary to incentivize individuals to pursue the
economic benefits of fame and fortune. Celebrity compensation
provides incentives for individuals to strive for fame in various
endeavors.141 Professional athletes can earn far more than the
average person even if they are only moderately successful.142 In
some industries the mere potential for above-average
compensation can provide adequate incentives. For example,
minor league baseball players earn subsistence salaries while
pursuing a mere chance to play major league ball with its attendant
high salaries and perks.143 Median salaries for entertainers are
likewise minimal but many still pursue fame and fortune in the
industry.144 Typically, an individual will not have the opportunity
to gain an economic benefit from his or her right of publicity until
they have become a celebrity,145 so the rewards of becoming a
celebrity are sufficient inducement to pursue such a path.

140

In C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007), the court denied a right of publicity action for
professional baseball players, in part, because it concluded the right of publicity was not
necessary to incentivize baseball players to excel.
141
See Gloria Franke, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: Will One Test
Ever Capture the Starring Role?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 955 (2006).
142
See, e.g., Jarrett Bell, Money Management a Difficult Lesson for NFL’s Rookie
Class, USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2010, 7:37 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
sports/football/nfl/2010-07-29-nfl-rookies-money-bankruptcy_N.htm; MLBPA INFO
Frequently Asked Questions, MLBPLAYERS.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/
faq.jsp#minimum (last visited July 26, 2012) (noting that minimum salary for a major
league baseball player in 2011 was $480,000).
143
See Garrett Broshuis, Playing for Peanuts, BASEBALL AMERICA (Mar. 31, 2010),
http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/minors/season-preview/2010/269689.html.
144
See, e.g., Musicians and Singers: Occupational Outlook Handbook, United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/ Entertainment-andSports/ Musicians-and-singers.htm (demonstrating that the median wage in 2009 for
singers and musicians was $22.36 per hour with full-time employment being rare).
145
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 572 (1977); see
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834–35 (6th Cir. 1983)
(arguing that the “right of publicity has developed to protect the commercial interest of
celebrities in their identities” and the right of privacy and the right of publicity protect
fundamentally different rights, with the former protecting the “right to be let alone” and
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Furthermore, if the right of publicity is a species of intellectual
property law, it must be balanced against competing interests.
Therefore, the right of a person to retain the economic value of his
or her public persona is not unlimited.146 It must be balanced
against the competing goals of promoting competition, insuring the
existence of a robust public domain, and protecting First
Amendment rights of free expression.
Judge Alex Kozinski, in an opinion highly critical of the White
case, stated the following in emphasizing the importance of
balancing the right of publicity against maintaining a vigorous
public domain:
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as
underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without
a rich public domain. Nothing today, like nothing
since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like
science and technology, grows by accretion, each
new creator building on the works of those who
came before.
Overprotection stifles the very
creative forces it’s supposed to nurture.147
In Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Association,148
the court was required to balance First Amendment rights in the
form of parodies against the right of publicity. The court had to
determine if parody baseball trading cards, which referred to active
professional baseball players, violated the players’ right of
publicity.149 The court, which concluded that the right of publicity
was not violated, stated:
One of the primary goals of intellectual property
law is to maximize creative expression. The law
attempts to achieve this goal by striking a proper
balance between the right of a creator to the fruits of
his labor and the right of future creators to free
the latter protecting “the celebrity’s pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of
his identity”); see also Franke, supra note 141, at 952.
146
See Leaffer, supra note 46, at 1363.
147
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting to order rejecting en banc rehearing).
148
95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
149
Id. at 962.
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expression. Underprotection of intellectual property
reduces the incentive to create; overprotection
creates a monopoly over the raw material of
creative expression. The application of the . . .
publicity rights statute to . . . [parody baseball]
trading cards presents a classic case of
overprotection. Little is to be gained, and much
lost, by protecting [the baseball players’] right to
control the use of [the players’] identities in parody
trading cards. The justifications for the right of
publicity are not nearly as compelling as those
offered for other forms of intellectual property, and
are particularly unpersuasive in the case of celebrity
parodies. The cards, on the other hand, are an
important form of entertainment and social
commentary that deserves First Amendment
protection.150
Judge Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in the Carson cases
approves of the existence of a right of publicity action to protect
the economic value of a celebrity’s persona.151 However, Judge
Kennedy is troubled by extending the scope of the right beyond
specific individual identifiers such as name or likeness.152 She
fears that such a broad view of the right of publicity has the
potential to interfere with the public domain by preventing certain
common words or phrases from being freely used by the public.153
She also noted that “commercial and competitive interests are
potentially compromised by an expansive approach to right of
publicity.”154 Finally, Judge Kennedy opines that the right of

150

Id. at 976.
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
152
“I do not believe that the common law right of publicity may be extended beyond an
individual’s name, likeness, achievements, identifying characteristics or actual
performances, to include phrases or other things which are merely associated with the
individual . . . .” Id. Judge Alex Kozinski shares the same view as Judge Kennedy. See
White, 989 F.2d at 1514.
153
Carson, 698 F.2d at 837.
154
Id. at 840.
151
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publicity may be preempted by federal copyright law,155 but even
if preemption is not applicable, First Amendment freedom of
speech concerns should limit broad interpretation of the right of
publicity.156
Although most judicial decisions have rejected a copyright
preemption argument,157 the First Amendment has been generally
recognized by courts as a constitutional limitation on the right of
publicity.158 As a general rule, the reporting of newsworthy
information159 or information of great public interest,160 as well as
parodies,161 are insulated by the First Amendment from a right of
publicity action. Despite agreement that the First Amendment can
155

Id. at 839–40.
Id. at 841.
157
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:50 at 832 (noting the majority rule is that federal
copyright law does not preempt state-based right of publicity); see also Jennifer E.
Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199,
225–26 (2002) (noting that few courts have found right of publicity preempted by
copyright law).
158
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 567–68 (1977)
(discussing interaction of state-based right of publicity action and First Amendment);
C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that First Amendment rights outweighed right of
publicity); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003) (“There is
an inherent tension between the right of publicity and the right of freedom of expression
under the First Amendment.”); see also Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th
Cir. 2003).
159
See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFB Publ’g Group, 572 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2009)
(finding First Amendment freedom of the press outweighs right of publicity with regard
to publication of newsworthy information); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr.
2d 790, 792 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding the right of publicity does not bar reporting
newsworthy facts); see also Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, No. C 299149, 1986 WL 215081,
at *1017 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 3, 1986) (describing how “newsworthy matters or matters
of legitimate public interest” are outside the domain of the right of publicity). Some right
of publicity statutes provide exceptions for conduct such as reporting news or information
about public affairs. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n,
95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996); Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr.
2d 307, 311–13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
160
See, e.g., Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (finding
a public interest defense can bar a right of publicity action); Rosemont Enter., Inc. v.
Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (describing how a
right of publicity action may be barred if it “conflicts with the free dissemination of
thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public interest”).
161
See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (holding First Amendment right to parody
athlete outweighs athlete’s right of publicity action).
156
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limit the right of publicity, courts have developed a variety of tests
for drawing a line between the property rights encapsulated in the
right of publicity and the free speech rights enshrined in the First
Amendment.162
As suspected, these tests are not always
163
consistent.
Moreover, some courts find First Amendment
interests outweigh the property rights under the right of publicity
without articulating any specific test.164
In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc.,165 the
defendant made a charcoal drawing of the Three Stooges that he
sold on t-shirts and as lithographs.166 Although the drawings were
original artistic works created by defendant, they were very lifelike
in nature.167 Therefore, selling them on shirts and as lithographs
clearly implicated the right of publicity.168
Nevertheless,
according to the court, the underlying property interest embodied
in the right of publicity was inseparable from the defendant’s First
Amendment right to freely create original artistic works.169 The
California Supreme Court, noting the conflict between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment, articulated what was to
become known as the transformative use test:

162

Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 769 (D.N.J. 2011) (describing how
courts use several balancing tests to determine if First Amendment free speech rights
limit a right of publicity action); see also Franke, supra note 141, at 963 (describing how
the transformative test and the predominant use test are most commonly used tests); W.
Webner & Leigh Lindquist, Transformation: The Bright Line Between Commercial
Publicity Rights and the First Amendment, 37 AKRON L. REV. 171, 185 (2004) (quoting
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 806 (Cal. 2001)) (noting that
state’s interest in protecting labor of performing artist must be balanced against
promoting free expression).
163
See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 50, § 6G[4][c] at 758 (noting recent case law
inconsistent with regard to interaction of First Amendment and right of publicity); see
also Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 774 (describing how general consensus does not exist with
regard to how to balance First Amendment free speech rights with the property rights
protected by right of publicity).
164
See, e.g., C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007).
165
21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
166
Id. at 800–01.
167
Id. at 811.
168
Id. at 802.
169
Id. at 802–03.
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A California statute grants the right of publicity to
specified successors in interest of deceased
celebrities, prohibiting any other person from using
a celebrity’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness for commercial purposes without the
consent of such successors. The United States
Constitution prohibits the states from abridging,
among other fundamental rights, freedom of speech.
In the case at bar we resolve a conflict between
these two provisions. . . . We formulate . . . what is
essentially a balancing test between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity based on
whether the work in question adds significant
creative elements so as to be transformed into
something more than a mere celebrity likeness or
imitation.170
The transformative use test171 is borrowed in part from the fair
use test utilized in copyright law172 to determine when the
perpetrators of certain infringing actions should be exempted from
liability in light of First Amendment concerns.173 Application of
the test in this case was relatively easy because defendant’s
drawings were very lifelike renderings of the Three Stooges.174
The difficult issue for future courts will be to determine how
transformative a work must be to outweigh a right of publicity
claim because this test is inherently vague and uncertain.175

170

Id. at 799.
See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 407 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011) (noting that, under the transformative use test, the question is whether the work at
issue has been so transformed that it is predominantly defendant’s expression rather than
merely a celebrity likeness); see also Donna Cunningham, Political Parody Collides with
the Right of Publicity: The Case of the Bobblehead Governor, 21 MIDWEST L.J. 119,
126–27 (2007) (discussing the transformative use test).
172
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
173
See Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 807–08 (rejecting wholesale adoption of the
fair use test while adopting the first factor of the four-factor fair use test, which requires
an analysis of the “the purpose and character of the use” and is codified in the copyright
law at 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)).
174
Id. at 811.
175
See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40
HOUS. L. REV. 903, 916–25 (2003) (critical discussion of the transformative use test).
171

C03_BECKERMAN-RODAU (DO NOT DELETE)

158

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

12/9/2012 2:13 PM

[Vol. 23:132

In Doe v. TCI Cablevision,176 a professional hockey player
named Tony Twist objected to defendant’s use of a comic book
character sharing his name.177 The Missouri Supreme Court,
noting the conflict between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment,178 indicated that a balancing test should be used to
determine which right prevails.179
The court rejected the
transformative use balancing test adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions, Inc. in favor of the
predominant use test.180 Under this test, the court sought to
determine whether the predominant use of the Mr. Twist’s identity
in defendant’s comic books sought to exploit the commercial value
of his identity, triggering a right of publicity action181 or whether
the predominant use was as expressive content—such as a
parody—which is constitutionally-protected speech that trumps the
right of publicity.182 The court concluded:
[T]he . . . reference to Twist, though a literary
device, has very little literary value compared to its
commercial value. On the record here, the use and
identity of Twist’s name has become predominantly
a ploy to sell comic books and related products
rather than an artistic or literary expression, and
under these circumstances, free speech must give
way to the right of publicity.183
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.184 involved an artist, Rick
Rush, who created paintings of famous athletes and sporting
events.185 The defendant was authorized to produce and sell
limited edition prints made from Mr. Rush’s paintings.186

176

110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
Id. at 365.
178
See id. at 372 (noting that this conflict has been a difficult issue and that courts have
generally struggled with it).
179
See id. at 373–74 (discussing the different balancing tests available).
180
See id. at 374.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 375.
183
Id. at 374.
184
332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
185
Id. at 918.
186
Id.
177
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Specifically, these were prints of a painting commemorating the
famous golfer Tiger Woods’ victory at the Masters Tournament in
Augusta, Georgia.187 In contrast to the drawing in Comedy III
Productions, Inc., which only contained a realistic likeness of the
Three Stooges,188 the print included more than a mere likeness of
Mr. Woods. It included other individuals and references to the
Masters Tournament and the Augusta golf course on which it is
played.189 Overall it portrayed a historic event in the sports
world.190 The court noted the tension between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment191 and identified the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition192 as providing the test
for balancing these rights.193 Under this approach, the First
Amendment prevails if a person’s identity is primarily used to
communicate information or ideas such as for news reporting,
biographies, novels, plays, or movies.194 In contrast, the right of
publicity prevails if a person’s name or likeness is used solely to
attract attention to a work that is unrelated to the person, or if the
work at issue contains substantially false information.195 The court
also noted that despite its reliance on the Restatement, the
transformative use test utilized in Comedy III Productions, Inc.
could be helpful, though not controlling.196 Ultimately, the court
concluded that the artist’s First Amendment rights outweighed Mr.
Woods’ right of publicity.197 This result seems consistent with
both the Restatement and the transformative use test since the artist
added substantial original work to the painting such that it was
significantly transformative.198
The painting was clearly
communicating that Mr. Woods won the Masters Tournament,

187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Id.
See id. at 936.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 931.
See id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46–48.
ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 931.
Id. at 930.
Id. at 930–31.
See id. at 936.
Id. at 938.
Id.
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which is a historic event in the sports world and thus argues for a
broader range of permissible uses of an individual’s persona.199
Additionally, other policy concerns outweigh application of the
labor and unjust enrichment theories in intangible property law.
Under the common law, a novel idea is generally not legally
protectable from unauthorized third party use unless it is a “welldeveloped” idea.200 This requirement is typically described as the
concrete or concreteness requirement.201 Under this approach, a
purely abstract idea is usually not entitled to property protection
regardless of its value or the effort entailed in developing it.202
Some courts have even held that an abstract idea cannot be the
subject of a contractual agreement.203
An identical result is reached under patent law.204 There, an
abstract idea is likewise not eligible to be considered for utility
patent protection.205 For example, even if a researcher spent years
and millions of dollars developing a mathematical formula that
describes previously unknown relationships in physics, it would
not be eligible for patent protection206—even if the potential
economic value of the formula was significant.207 However, a

199

Id.
See Tate v. Scanlan Int’l, Inc., 403 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (legal
protection only extended to ideas that are both novel and well-developed); see also
Sellers v. Am. Broad. Co., 668 F.2d 1207, 1210 (11th Cir. 1982) (action for
misappropriation of idea only allowed if idea is both novel and concrete).
201
Scanlan Int’l, Inc., 403 N.W.2d at 672 (concrete requirement satisfied if idea
sufficiently complete so that it can be used without the need for any significant
development before it can be implemented).
202
See Smith v. Recrion Corp., 541 P.2d 663, 669 (Nev. 1975) (legal protection only
extends to abstract ideas that are both novel and concrete). See generally Wrench LLC v.
Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 460 (6th Cir. 2001) (typically ideas must be both novel
and concrete in order to be protected as property).
203
See, e.g., Scanlan Int’l, Inc., 403 N.W.2d at 671 (idea must be both novel and
concrete to be subject of a contract).
204
See generally Jennings v. Brenner, 255 F. Supp. 410 (D.D.C. 1966) (a contract
cannot consist of an abstract idea).
205
Id. at 412.
206
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“Einstein could not patent
his celebrated law that E=mc;2 nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.”).
207
See Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 316 U.S. 364, 384 (1942). See
Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309 (“The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas
have been held not patentable.”); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
200
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machine that utilizes the formula to complete a specific task would
be patent-eligible.208
By contrast, copyright law denies protection to all ideas and
information, not just abstract ideas.209 This is reflected in the
delineation between ideas, which go unprotected, and copyright
law’s protection of original means of expressing ideas.210 A news
organization, for example, may spend substantial money
maintaining an overseas news bureau. Based on substantial
expenditures, the news organization publishes a series of articles
that reveal previously secret information about governmental
activities. Anyone is free to use the information disclosed in the
articles even though such use potentially amounts to free riding or
unjust enrichment.211 Copyright law does not protect such
information.212 Only the form of expression of the information in
the articles is protected.213 Therefore, a third party could not copy
the articles verbatim, but they could extract and use the
information in the articles.214 A competing news organization may
even be able to freely use the information in its original news
stories.215

2005) (basic scientific discoveries that are only useful for engaging in further research are
ineligible for patent protection).
208
See generally Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874) (“An idea
of itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically useful
is.”).
209
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797
F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986) (ideas not protected by copyright).
210
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (copyright law protects expression of
an idea but not the idea itself); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d
738, 741 (9th Cir. 1971) (copyright only protects form of expression of idea but not idea
itself).
211
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
See id. at 353–54. Although copyright law may be inapplicable in this situation, the
Supreme Court did enjoin one news-gathering organization from free riding on the work
of a competing news-gathering organization under a common law unfair competition
theory generally referred to as a misappropriation action. Int’l News Serv v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). However, this theory has rarely been successful in
subsequent disputes. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Ideas and the Public Domain:
Revisiting INS v. AP in the Internet Age, 1 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW 1, 15
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Trademark law recognizes and protects investments in
marketing and branding efforts that infuse a trademark with a
substantial mental association.216 For example, the law protects
the mental association that exists when a consumer sees the word
“Coke” or “Toyota” on an appropriate product.217 Nevertheless, in
the interest of promoting competition, unauthorized use of a
trademark is permitted in comparative advertising.218
Unauthorized use of a trademark is also permitted for purposes of
social commentary,219 parody,220 artistic expression,221 and news
reporting222 consistent with First Amendment rights. Finally,
unauthorized third party commercial use of a trademark is
generally permissible if such use does not result in a likelihood of
confusion among the intended consumer group.223
Likewise, trade secrets law does not rely exclusively on a labor
or unjust enrichment theory for its justification. Although it allows
protection for a broad range of information that provides an
economic advantage over competitors,224 it also allows free riding
(2011) (critical discussion of International News Service advocating elimination of the
misappropriation action).
216
See, e.g., Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir.
1987) (trademark law protects property interest in a trademark).
217
See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresege Co., 316 U.S.
203, 205 (1942) (“A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser
to select what he wants, or what he had been led to believe he wants . . . .”).
218
See SSP Agric. Equip., Inc. v. Orchard-Rite, Ltd., 592 F.2d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir.
1979) (using competitor’s trademark in a comparative advertisement is allowable absent
consumer confusion or misrepresentations).
219
See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1994).
220
See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., 886 F.2d 490
(2d Cir. 1989) (finidng the use of trademark in parody of Cliffs Notes study guide not
actionable under trademark law).
221
See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1281 (11th
Cir. 2012) (finding the use of trademarks in original paintings of college football players
not actionable under trademark law).
222
Lisa P. Ramsey, Free Speech and International Obligations to Protect Trademarks,
35 YALE J. INT’L L. 405, 413 (2010).
223
See Int’l Jenson, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 827 (9th Cir. 1993).
See generally Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting that trademark law protects consumers from confusion, but if a trademark enters
the common vocabulary and becomes a cultural reference it is no longer serving a
trademark function and First Amendment rights then trump trademark rights).
224
See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (1985); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (“A trade secret is any information that can be used in
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under certain circumstances.225 For example, a company may
spend millions of dollars developing a new product line, but each
individual product might sell for only a few hundred dollars. A
competitor could buy the product, reverse engineer it and, based on
its findings, it could then manufacture and sell a copy of the
product.226 This might allow the competitor to free ride by
avoiding the costly research and development work done by the
original company that created the product. Such action is legally
permissible despite the fact that it ultimately amounts to free
riding.227
The above approaches under the common law, patent law,
copyright law, trademark, and trade secrets law may seem unfair
from the perspective of a labor and unjust enrichment theory.
Without negating the value of these theories, the question then
becomes whether there are competing underlying policies that
weigh against the labor and unjust enrichment theories. In general,
the importance of allowing abstract ideas and information to be
part of the public domain traditionally has been viewed as a
competing and superseding policy.228 Sometimes this policy is
the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret
to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”).
225
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995) (“The
freedom to compete in the marketplace includes, in the absence of patent, copyright, or
trademark protection . . . the freedom to copy the goods, methods, processes, and ideas of
others.”).
226
Reverse engineering is the process of “starting with the known product and working
backward to divine the process which aided in its development or manufacture.”
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
227
See id. (noting that reverse engineering is legally permissible under trade secrets
law).
228
In White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), Judge Kozinski stated:
[I]t may seem unfair that much of the fruit of a creator’s labor may be
used by others without compensation. But this is not some
unforeseen byproduct of our intellectual property system; it is the
system’s very essence. Intellectual property law assures authors the
right to their original expression, but encourages others to build
freely on the ideas that underlie it. This result is neither unfair nor
unfortunate: It is the means by which intellectual property law
advances the progress of science and art. We give authors certain
exclusive rights, but in exchange we get a richer public domain.
Id.

C03_BECKERMAN-RODAU (DO NOT DELETE)

164

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

12/9/2012 2:13 PM

[Vol. 23:132

found in the critical importance of the First Amendment freedom
of speech rights, which must be strongly protected in a
democracy.229 In the commercial context, the desire to promote
competition may also provide justification for treating some things
as part of the public domain and therefore denying them property
protection.230 Finally, the importance of information to the public
generally may sometimes outweigh giving private ownership to
intangibles.231 Nevertheless, such concerns should never totally
outweigh intangible property rights, which are also critical to the
existence of both a democracy and a free enterprise economic
system.232 The issue then becomes how to provide property
protection for a person’s persona without overreaching and
interfering with these competing concerns.
IV. ASSOCIATION-BASED RELATIONSHIPS VS. CONFUSION-BASED
RELATIONSHIPS
As previously discussed, right of publicity actions can be
viewed on a continuum that includes both confusion-based and
association-based relationships. Confusion-based relationships
include situations where a person’s name or likeness is used in
commercial advertising, creating a likelihood that consumers will

229

See U.S. v. Carrier, 672 F.2d 300, 305 (2d Cir. 1982) (free dissemination of ideas is
an essential element of democracy). See also Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 326–27
(1937) (Cardozo, J.) (noting freedom of thought and speech are indispensable to nearly
every other form of freedom).
230
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995) (“Freedom to
engage in business and to compete for the patronage of prospective customers is a
fundamental premise of the free enterprise system.”).
231
See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (mathematical
formulas such as E=mc2 or the discovery of a new mineral or plant are not patentable
subject matter); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (discovery of new and
useful mathematical formula not patent-eligible subject matter); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (scientific truth even if expressed as a mathematical formula not
patentable); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1293(2012) (laws of nature, natural phenomena, mental processes, and abstract
ideas not eligible for patent protection). Accord Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225
(2010).
232
See generally White, 989 F.2d at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting importance
of balances built into intellectual property law between what a creator owns and what
portion of such creations are free for everyone to use as part of the public domain).
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believe the person endorses or approves of the advertised
product.233 Typically, the use of the name or picture of a celebrity
in an advertisement without any type of disclaimer will per se
cause consumers to believe the person endorses or approves of the
product in the advertisement.234
Such a result should be
actionable. In contrast, mere references that conjure associations
with a person do not automatically create a likelihood that
consumers will be confused as to whether the person endorses or
approves of the product.235 However, if such likelihood is shown
to exist, then a confusion-based action should be permitted.236
Further along the continuum are association-based
relationships where commercial advertising causes consumers to
associate the product or the advertisement with a celebrity but such
consumers do not believe the celebrity endorsed or approved of the
advertised product.237 For example, in the previously discussed
Carson case the court concluded that selling portable toilets with
the advertising phrase “Here’s Johnny” could cause consumers to
make an association with Mr. Carson even though consumers
would not think he endorsed or was affiliated with the business in
any way.238 Likewise, David Letterman has made his humorous
top ten lists famous.239 As a result, using a top ten list in
advertising could create a mental association with Mr.
Letterman.240 For example, LexisNexis produced the following
advertising brochure:

233

See e.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir.
1983).
234
See Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 627 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“When a
public figure of Woody Allen’s stature appears in an advertisement, his mere presence is
inescapably to be interpreted as an endorsement.”).
235
See generally ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting
that the Sixth Circuit has created an eight-factor test to determine the likelihood of
confusion).
236
Id. at 925–26.
237
See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2002).
238
Carson, 698 F.2d at 836.
239
An archive of Mr. Letterman’s Top Ten lists is available at
http://www.cbs.com/late_night/late_show/top_ten/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
240
Numerous websites and books dedicated to top ten lists exist. See, e.g., The Top
Tens, available at http://www.the-top-tens.com/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2012); Top Tenz,
available at http://www.toptenz.net/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
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The above advertisement is likely to produce, at most, an
association-based relationship with Mr. Letterman rather than a
confusion-based relationship. Such a relationship should not be
barred by a potential right of publicity action.
The following advertisement for a 2004 Michael Moore film241
may have also created an association-based relationship—but not a
confusion-based relationship—with Ray Bradbury, author of the
famous book Fahrenheit 451.242 Nevertheless, this should not be a
basis for a right of publicity action by Mr. Bradbury. Likewise,
President George W. Bush should not have a right of publicity
action merely because his picture was used in an advertisement to
commercialize a movie. It is unlikely that consumers will believe
President Bush would have endorsed a movie critical of his
presidency.

241

HTTP://WWW.FAHRENHEIT911.COM/ABOUT/POSTER/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). See
http://www.michaelmoore.com/books-films/fahrenheit-911 (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
242
RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (1953).
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Moreover, confusion-based relationships do not need
protection via the right of publicity; such relationships are already
protected generally by trademark and unfair competition law.243
Today, the scope of subject matter protectable as a trademark or
service mark is very broad.244 For example, it is possible for a
celebrity to register his or her name as a trademark and/or service
mark under federal trademark law.245 Unfair competition actions
243

See J. Thomas MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 28.14 (4th
ed. 2012) (noting that falsity is not a necessary element of infringement of the right of
publicity, where this could easily be proven via trademark infringement).
244
See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (green-gold
color of press pads used by dry cleaners can be a trademark); In re Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (pink color of fiberglass insulation
recognized as a trademark); Registration No. 2,007, 624 (mark for goats on a roof of
grass for restaurant services); Registration No. 3,155,702 (sensory or touch trademark
registered for the feel of a velvet-textured covering on a bottle of wine); GOLDSTEIN &
REESE, supra note 2, at 256–57 (three-dimensional product packages can be protected as
trademarks); Douglas D. Churovich, Scents, Sense or Cents?; Something Stinks in the
Lanham Act: Scientific Obstacles to Scent Marks, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 293, 294–
95 (2001) (discussing trademark registration of a scent that was applied to thread and
yarn). See generally Gary Myers, Statutory Interpretation, Property Rights, and
Boundaries: The Nature and Limits of Protection in Trademark Dilution, Trade Dress,
and Product Configuration Cases, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 241 (2000) (discussing
expansion of trademark rights today).
245
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4), (f) (2006) (allowing surname to be registered as
trademark provided it has acquired distinctiveness); see also Russell Jacobs, Recapturing
Rareness: The Significance of Surname Rareness in Trademark Registration
Determinations, 50 IDEA 395 (2010) (discussing registering names as trademarks). The
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are also permitted and have been broadly construed under federal
trademark law such that they apply even in the absence of an
existing trademark.246 Both trademark infringement actions and
unfair competition actions, which are also available under state
law, are premised on protecting the consuming public from actual
or potential deception.247 As a general rule, the legal standard used
in such actions under both federal and state law is whether a
substantial number of people in the intended consumer market are
likely to be confused with regard to some aspect or characteristic
of the product or service being sold.248 This includes creating a
likelihood that someone—typically a celebrity—endorses or
approves of a product or service when in reality that is untrue.249
Hence, any use of a celebrity’s name or likeness would be
actionable as trademark infringement or unfair competition if
members of the intended consumer market are likely to incorrectly
believe the celebrity endorses or supports the product or services

musicians Beyoncé Knowles and Jay-Z filed trademark application for the name of their
daughter, Blue Ivy Carter. Although the trademark application has initially been rejected
by the Patent and Trademark Office, it is still pending. See Roxanne Roberts & Amy
Argetsinger, The Reliable Source, WASHINGTON POST (Feb 3, 2012, 1:39 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/reliable-source/post/blue-ivy-the-trademark-fedsmove-fast-on-rights-to-beyonce-and-jay-zs-babys-name/2012/02/03/gIQAOTDGnQ
_blog.html.
246
See Kournikova v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., No. CV 02-3747 GAF, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25810, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2002) (“A celebrity may bring a false
endorsement claim for the unauthorized use of her identity if such use is likely to confuse
consumers as to the celebrity’s sponsorship or approval of the product.”). See generally
Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (unfair competition
action under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) is a new federal tort what covers more than trademark
infringement and it should be construed broadly to remedy unfair competitive actions).
247
See Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 2007).
248
See Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 618 F.3d 441, 449 (4th Cir.
2010) (“[T]he tests for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham
Act are essentially the same as that for common law unfair competition . . . ; all focus on
the likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods involved.”); see also Karl Storz
Endoscopy-Am., Inc. v. Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2002) (test for
trademark infringement is whether consumers will be likely to be confused as to source
or origin of relevant product or service); Storball v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20455, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1993) (unfair competition claim
based on false endorsement requires showing a likelihood that consumers will be
confused “as to the origin, approval, or endorsement of the product”).
249
See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 243, § 28.15.
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his name or likeness is associated with.250 This same standard
should apply even if the name or likeness of the celebrity is not
used, such as in the Carson case.251 The ultimate controlling issue
should be whether consumers are likely to be confused.
Therefore, neither trademark infringement nor unfair
competition law would render the use of a person’s name or
likeness actionable in the absence of any likelihood of consumer
confusion.252 Typically, the line is drawn to support a robust
public domain, to engender free competition, and to accommodate
First Amendment free speech considerations.253 This means a
certain amount of free riding must be tolerated without the ability
to bring legal action barring it.254 For example, one common overthe-counter painkiller is better known via its trademark or brand
name, TYLENOL,255 than by its generic product name,
acetaminophen or paracetamol.256 This is a consequence of
substantial advertising and marketing expenditures by the maker of
the TYLENOL brand of acetaminophen.257
Hence, some

250

See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 1992).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 243, § 28.15.
252
See Kournikova v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., No. CV 02-3747 GAF, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25810, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2002) (“A celebrity may bring a false
endorsement claim for the unauthorized use of her identity if such use is likely to confuse
consumers as to the celebrity’s sponsorship or approval of the product.”).
253
See generally White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1402 (9th Cir.
1992) (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (noting that when protecting intellectual property, the
court must balance competing interests between protecting the creation and investment of
intellectual property while preventing monopolies that would inhibit creative
expressions).
254
See generally White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir.
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting careful balances built into intellectual property
law which allow the public to use things created by others).
255
See Too Much Acetaminophen over Time May Damage Liver, USA TODAY, Nov.
23, 2011, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/story/health/ story/2011-1123/Too-much-acetaminophen-over-time-may-damage-liver/51369772/1.
256
See
Acetaminophen,
PUBMED
HEALTH,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmedhealth/PMH0000521/ (last visited June 22, 2012) (for information on
acetaminophen).
257
See Jerry Knight, Tylenol’s Maker Shows How to Respond to Crisis, WASH. POST,
Oct. 11, 1982. See generally At 50, Tylenol Brand Still Gaining Steam, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9879888/ns/health-health_care/t/
tylenol-brand-still-gaining-steam/ (last visited June 22, 2012) (discussing success of
brand).
251
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competitors, as shown below, who are free to make and sell
generic versions of acetaminophen, place labels on their products
which inform consumers that their product is equivalent to or
should be compared to TYLENOL.258

Such conduct allows the above sellers to free ride on the value
of the TYLENOL brand without the costs of creating the strong
mental association with that brand. However, as long as the
labeling is true and it does not cause a likelihood of consumer
confusion, such free riding is not actionable under unfair
competition law, nor is it trademark infringement because it only
creates an association-based relationship between the product and
the TYLENOL brand.259 Despite any unjust enrichment from such
free riding, it can be justified on the basis of enhancing
Furthermore,
competition among acetaminophen makers.260
258

For Equate image see http://www.walmart.com/ip/Equate-Extra-Strength-ValuePack-Acetaminophen-Non-Aspirin/10324477 (last visited July 27, 2012); for Walgreens
image see http://www.drugstore.com/walgreens-childrens-pain-reliever-acetaminophenmeltaways-bubble-gum/qxp369209 (last visited July 27, 2012).
259
See SSP Agric. Equip., Inc. v. Orchard-Rite, Ltd., 592 F.2d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir.
1979) (using competitor’s trademark in a comparative advertisement is allowable absent
consumer confusion or misrepresentations).
260
See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1408 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Alarcon, J., dissenting) (noting that when protecting intellectual property, the court must
balance competing interests between protecting the creation and investment of
intellectual property while preventing monopolies that would inhibit creative
expressions).
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prohibiting the generic makers from marking their product as being
comparable or equivalent to TYLENOL would amount to barring
truthful commercial speech.261
The above types of association-based relationships should not
be actionable.262 Under this approach, Mr. Carson could not have
pursued a right of publicity action in the Carson case.263 Likewise,
Ms. White would be unable to pursue a right of publicity action in
the White case absent a showing that a confusion-based
relationship existed which caused consumers to be likely to believe
the advertisement’s use of a robot on a television game show set to
sell Samsung products was endorsed by Ms. White.264
Limiting the right of publicity to confusion-based relationships
may render the cause of action redundant and therefore
unnecessary because, as noted above, trademark law and unfair
competition law generally already make such conduct actionable.
Additionally, this approach allows application of the previouslydeveloped delineation in intellectual property law between
marketplace conduct that is permissible, and conduct that is
impermissible trademark infringement or unfair competition.
The effect of this approach is actually limited because many
right of publicity disputes involve confusion-based relationships,
so a trademark or unfair competition theory could often have
provided relief in lieu of the right of publicity.265 It is only conduct
that would allow a right of publicity action for an associationbased relationship that would be eliminated.
For example, Bette Midler was involved in a right of publicity
action that involved a sound-alike singer imitating Ms. Midler’s
voice without her permission in a Ford automobile commercial.266

261

See generally Leaffer, supra note 46, at 1364 (arguing a right of publicity action
should be based on unfair competition or trademark theory rather than a property
misappropriation theory).
262
Id. at 1373.
263
See supra text accompanying notes 56–75.
264
See supra text accompanying notes 76–92.
265
Id. at 1364.
266
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
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The song involved—”Do You Want to Dance?”267—was protected
via copyright and it was used pursuant to a license from the
copyright owner.268 The company used the sound-alike singer
after Ms. Midler refused an offer to participate in the
commercial.269 The evidence established that the sound-alike
singer sounded enough like Ms. Midler to cause some consumers
to believe Ms. Midler performed for the commercial.270 This is an
example of a confusion-based relationship that should be
actionable under an unfair competition theory271 and possibly also
267

BETTE MIDLER, Do You Want to Dance?, on THE DIVINE MISS M (Atlantic Records
1972).
268
Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
269
Id. at 461.
270
Id. at 461–62.
271
However, the court appeared to deny an unfair competition action due to a lack of
economic injury to Ms. Midler. The court stated “we do not find unfair competition here.
One-minute commercials of the sort the defendants put on would not have saturated
Midler’s audience and curtailed her market. Midler did not do television commercials.
The defendants were not in competition with her.” Id. at 462–63. Interestingly, Ms.
Midler subsequently changed her mind and did a car commercial for Honda in 2011. See
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=GhyLD2tWcKU (last visited on June 25,
2012). The court’s requirement that Ms. Midler must be a competitor who suffers
economic damages is contrary to other unfair competition actions, which frame the
controlling issue as a question of whether consumers are likely to be confused. See, e.g.,
Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (one purpose of unfair
competition action under federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), is to protect
consumers from wide variety of untrue representations about goods and services provided
in commerce). Consequently, if a likelihood of consumer confusion exists with regard to
whether Ms. Midler was actually singing in the commercial, then she should be able to
assert unfair competition, and her remedy should be damages and possibly an injunction
barring playing the commercial in the future. See generally Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978
F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding singer Tom Waits successfully asserted an unfair
competition claim for unauthorized use of a sound-alike in a radio commercial).
Although the remedy available for unfair competition has traditionally been damages
and/or injunctive relief, that may be different today following the Supreme Court
decision eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). In eBay, the Court
overruled precedent which held that a patent owner was entitled to a permanent
injunction against continuing infringement after a trial on the merits found infringement.
Id. at 1840–41. The Court held that a patent owner was entitled to damages but that
injunctive relief was up to the discretion of the trial judge. Id. at 1839. See generally
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in Judicial Activism in
Interpreting the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 10 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 165, 166 (2007) (critical analysis of the eBay decision). Although the
eBay decision arose in the context of a patent infringement dispute, its holding is not
limited to patent law disputes. See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith,
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under a trademark infringement action.272 Nevertheless, the court
utilized a right of publicity theory and treated the sound of Ms.
Midler’s voice as a pure common law property right.273 This gave
her the right to control who used it without regard to
countervailing considerations.274
In a similar case, a singer who sounded like Tom Waits was
used in a radio commercial to sell SalsaRio Doritos, a snack
food.275 Like Ms. Midler, Mr. Waits is a well-known singer who
had a policy of not doing commercials.276 In both cases, evidence
of actual confusion existed.277 Based on the distinctive voice of
Mr. Waits, which was captured by the sound-alike singer, a jury
found liability under a right of publicity theory and a federal unfair
competition theory.278 As for the federal unfair competition claim,

The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 203, 205 (2012). The trend in favor of damages in lieu of injunctive
relief has also been seen in real property disputes. For example, a permanent injunction
was the traditional remedy for interference with the use and enjoyment of real property
due to a finding that a neighboring landowner was engaged in a nuisance. See Boomer v.
Atl. Cement Co., Inc., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970) (noting rule that
injunction was traditional remedy for an ongoing nuisance); see also Morgan v. High
Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682 (N.C. 1953) (remedy for nuisance was permanent
injunction). Nevertheless, some judicial decisions have awarded damages in lieu of a
permanent injunction thereby allowing the unwanted condition to continue subject to
payment for such conduct. See, e.g., Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 873 (overruling the
traditional remedy and allowing the party creating the nuisance to continue the activity
upon payment of monetary damages for present and future nuisance).
272
In light of Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 171–73 (1995),
almost anything that is source-indicating can be registered as a trademark today. This
includes music and other sounds that have been registered as trademarks under federal
law. See, e.g., THE SOUND OF THE FAMOUS TARZAN YELL, Registration No. 2,210,506; see
also Ride the Ducks, LLC v. Duck Boat Tours, Inc., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1269, 1274 (E.D. Pa.
2005) (noting sound can be a trademark); Melissa E. Roth, Something Old, Something
New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: A New Tradition in Nontraditional
Trademark Registrations, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 457, 469 (2005) (sound trademarks
registerable in the United States). See generally Rita Heimes, Trademarks, Identity, and
Justice, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 133, 137 (2011) (colors, sounds, smells,
and product packaging can be trademarks).
273
Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
274
Id. at 463–464.
275
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992).
276
Id. at 1097.
277
Id. at 1111.
278
Id. at 1096.
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the court rejected any requirement that Mr. Waits be in
competition with regard to the sale of Doritos.279 Instead, the court
styled the claim as a false endorsement claim280 and upheld the
jury’s finding that in light of all the circumstances “consumers
were likely to be misled by the commercial into believing that
[Mr.] Waits endorsed SalsaRio Doritos.”281 Interestingly, the court
found some of the damages awarded for the right of publicity
action and the unfair competition claim to be duplicative, so a
portion of the damages were vacated.282
In Allen v. National Video, Inc.,283 the defendant, a person who
looked like the well-known filmmaker and actor Woody Allen,
was used in advertisements to take advantage of his resemblance to
Mr. Allen.284 Mr. Allen brought an action asserting unfair
competition and violation of his right to publicity.285 The court
declined to resolve the right of publicity action because it
concluded that the dispute could be resolved under unfair
competition law.286 The court held that an unfair competition
action available under federal law287 should be broadly construed
to protect consumers from misrepresentations about products and
services made available in commerce.288 Additionally, the unfair
competition action should cover unfair competitive practices that
cause actual or potential consumer deception.289 The court
enjoined use of defendant’s image in the advertisements at issue
after finding a violation of the federal unfair competition statute.290
The court’s holding rested on a finding that the advertisements

279

Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1106–11.
281
Id. at 1111.
282
Id. at 1112. Nevertheless, the court upheld an award of $2.6 million that was
comprised of compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Id. at 1096.
283
610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
284
Id. at 618.
285
Id. at 617, 632.
286
Id. at 625. It should be noted that a right to publicity action in the relevant
jurisdiction in this case—New York—was constrained by statute such that it was more
narrowly applied than in other jurisdictions. Id. at 624 n.5.
287
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
288
Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 625.
289
Id.
290
Id. at 630.
280
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would be likely to confuse consumers into believing that Mr. Allen
was either appearing in the advertisements or that he endorsed or
approved of the advertisement with defendant’s image.291 The
court noted that it was relying on the well-established likelihood of
confusion analysis utilized in federal trademark infringement
actions292 because this analysis is “the heart of a successful
claim”293 under both federal and state trademark infringement
actions and even under state unfair competition law actions.294
In Wendt v. Host International, Inc.,295 the owner of the
intellectual property rights to the television show Cheers

291

Id. at 628–30.
This analysis requires the court to consider the following factors in deciding if a
likelihood of confusion exists:
1) the strength of plaintiff’s marks and name;
2) the similarity of plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks;
3) the proximity of plaintiff’s and defendant’s products;
4) evidence of actual confusion as to source or sponsorship;
5) sophistication of the defendant’s audience; and
6) defendant’s good or bad faith.
Id. at 627 (applying the above factors, the court substituted the likenesses of defendant
and Mr. Allen for the references to marks in the factors). Most courts apply the same or
similar factors in analyzing likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft
Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979) (factors considered in determining
likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement action: strength of the mark; proximity
of the goods; similarity of the marks; evidence of actual confusion; marketing channels
used; type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser;
defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and likelihood of expansion of the product
lines); Naked Cowboy v. CBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23,
2012) (factors considered in federal trademark infringement action and federal unfair
competition action: the strength of plaintiff’s mark; the similarity of the parties’ marks;
the proximity of the parties’ products in the marketplace; the likelihood that the prior user
will bridge the gap between the products; actual confusion; the defendant’s good or bad
faith in adopting the mark; the quality of defendant’s product; and the sophistication of
the relevant consumer group); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d
1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831,
833 (6th Cir. 1983).
293
Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 627 (quoting Standard & Poor’s Corp. v. Commodity
Exchange, Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1982)).
294
See id.; accord Food Scis. Corp. v. Nagler, No. 09-1798, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112072, at *5 (D.N.J. 2010). See generally Summit Entertainment, LLC v. B.B. Dakota
Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151582, at *20 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (noting the same likelihood
of confusion test applies to federal and state trademark infringement and unfair
competition actions).
295
125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
292
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authorized the creation of airport bars that resembled the bar in the
television show.296 Additionally, animatronic robotic figures that
resembled Norm and Cliff, two characters on the show, were
placed in the bars,297 although the figures were called Bob and
Hank.298 George Wendt and John Ratzenberger were the actors
who played the Norm and Cliff characters in the television
show.299 They brought an action arguing that the use of the Bob
and Hank robots in the bars violated their rights of publicity and
their federal unfair competition rights300 despite the fact that the
facial features of the robots were totally different than the facial
features of Mr. Wendt and Mr. Ratzenberger.301 The appellate
court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the action on a motion
for summary judgment.302 The appellate court held that the right
of publicity action involved factual questions that a jury must
decide.303 Additionally, the appellate court, consistent with the
decisions discussed above, held that the federal unfair competition
action was a false endorsement claim304 that should be analyzed
under the traditional test for likelihood of confusion305 to
determine if consumers would believe, based on the robotic figures
in the bars, that Mr. Wendt and Mr. Ratzenberger endorsed the
airport bars based on the Cheers television show.306
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that a person should
have a legal cause of action when his or her persona is used
commercially to create a confusion-based relationship between a

296

Id. at 809.
Id.
298
Id. at 811.
299
Id.
300
Id. at 809.
301
See id. (finding no similarity between the robots and Mr. Wendt and Mr.
Ratzenberger and noting they had totally different facial features).
302
Id. The case was subsequently settled and it is presumed Mr. Wendt and Mr.
Ratzenberger were compensated in return for ending the litigation. See ERIC FREYFOGLE
& BRADLEY KARKKAINEN, PROPERTY LAW: POWER, GOVERNANCE, AND THE COMMON
GOOD 426 (2012).
303
Wendt, 125 F.3d at 810–12.
304
Id. at 812.
305
Id.
306
See id. at 812–13 (“The issue is whether a consumer would be confused as to Wendt
and Ratzenberger’s association with or sponsorship of [the airport] bars.”).
297
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good or service and the person. However, a cause of action should
not typically be available if only an association-based commercial
relationship is created. This negates the need for the right of
publicity cause of action in many contexts because an unauthorized
confusion-based relationship is already actionable under an unfair
competition or trademark infringement action.
Additionally, commercial speech likely to confuse or mislead
consumers is not typically entitled to First Amendment
protection.307
Therefore, limiting the right of publicity to
confusion-based relationships greatly minimizes the need for
courts to resolve the difficult conflicts between the right of
publicity, which usually involves commercial speech, and the First
Amendment.
Nevertheless, a right of publicity action may be viable in the
limited context when a famous persona is involved.
V. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND TRADEMARK DILUTION
Dilution law provides an exception to the distinction between
commercial conduct that creates a confusion-based relationship308
and commercial conduct that merely creates an association-based
relationship.309 It allows a cause of action for trademark dilution in
situations where an infringement action is not viable.310 Dilution
307

Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802 (Cal. 2001).
A trademark infringement action represents a confusion-based relationship. See 15
U.S.C. § 1114(1)(2006) (providing for trademark infringement action under federal
trademark law based on certain conduct that “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive”).
309
See id. § 1125(c) (providing a federal cause of action for trademark dilution); see
also 54 PA. CONSOL. STAT. § 1124 (2012) (providing a state statutory cause of action for
trademark dilution under Pennsylvania law). Some states recognize a common law
dilution action. See, e.g., Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 424 (6th Cir.
1999) (“Ohio courts recognize a common law cause of action for dilution.”).
310
In contrast to trademark infringement actions, trademark dilution actions do not
require any consumer confusion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1) (stating no actual or
likelihood of confusion necessary for dilution under federal law). In Rosetta Stone Ltd. v.
Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 167 (4th Cir. 2012), the court noted that the purpose of
trademark infringement law is to prevent consumer confusion but this is not the premise
for dilution actions. See also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Clinical Data, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 604,
606–07 (D. Mass. 1985) (finding consumer confusion not necessary for dilution under
Massachusetts state dilution law). See generally I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co.,
308
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actions are based on the existence of an unauthorized associationbased commercial relationship.311 Arguably, a dilution action
recognize a property right in a trademark per se, in contrast to
trademark infringement law which typically only recognizes a
property right in the mental association created in the minds of the
intended consumers when they see a trademark affixed to a
product.312 The broad range of protection provided by dilution is
mitigated by a requirement that such a cause of action is only
available for a limited number of trademarks313—only famous
163 F.3d 27, 48–49 (1st Cir. 1998) (describing how dilution can occur absent any
consumer confusion and even if non-competing goods are involved).
311
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), which states:
[T]he owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or
through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction
against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has
become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in
commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual
economic injury. Id. (emphasis added).
312
See generally Matthew Slowik, Ahead of the Curve? The Effect of the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006 on the Federal Circuit, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 349, 362 (2008)
(describing how many commentators concerned about dilution right becoming a per se
property right in trademark).
313
In Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 143, 169–
70 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875
(9th Cir. 1999)), the court stated:
[D]ilution is a cause of action invented and reserved for a select class
of marks—those marks with such powerful consumer associations
that even non-competing uses can impinge on their value. Dilution
causes of action, much more so than infringement and unfair
competition laws, tread very close to granting “rights in gross” in a
trademark. In the infringement and unfair competition scenario,
where the less famous a trademark, the less the chance that
consumers will be confused as to origin, a carefully-crafted balance
exists between protecting a trademark and permitting non-infringing
uses. In the dilution context, likelihood of confusion is irrelevant. If
dilution protection were accorded to trademarks based only on a
showing of inherent or acquired distinctiveness, we would upset the
balance in favor of over-protecting trademarks, at the expense of
potential non-infringing uses.
We view the famousness prong of both dilution analyses [i.e.,
under federal law and California law] as reinstating the balance—by
carefully limiting the class of trademarks eligible for dilution
protection, Congress and state legislatures granted the most potent
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trademarks are entitled to dilution protection.314 “Famous”
trademarks are, quite simply, marks that are widely known by the
general public.315 Additionally, the traditional remedy permitted is
injunctive relief316—in contrast to trademark infringement law,
which allows both monetary damages and injunctive relief.317 This
dilution action can be viewed as an attempt to protect the
trademark owner’s investment in his or her mark, when the
investment has resulted in the trademark becoming very strong and
widely known to consumers.318
By analogy, the analysis that justifies a trademark dilution
action should apply to a right of publicity action. Only celebrities
who have become famous (in the trademark law sense that they are
widely known by the general consuming public) should be able to
assert a right of publicity action based on showing an unauthorized
association-based commercial transaction.319 A lesser-known
form of trademark protection in a manner designed to minimize
undue impact on other uses.
Therefore, to meet the “famousness” element of protection
under the dilution statutes, “a mark [must] be truly prominent and
renowned.”
Id.
314
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006); see also Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning
LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that whether a trademark is famous is
a threshold question for purposes of a federal dilution action).
315
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (“A mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or
services of the mark’s owner.”).
316
See Greater Lansing Ass’n of Realtors v. Mentzer-Amundson, No. 210504, 2000
Mich. App. LEXIS 1236, at *18 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)
(stating the remedy for dilution under federal law is injunctive relief).
317
See id. §§ 1114, 1116 (permitting damages for trademark infringement and allowing
injunctive relief for trademark infringement).
318
Christopher R. Perry, Trademarks as Commodities: The “Famous” Roadblock to
Applying Trademark Dilution Law in Cyberspace, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1127, 1130–31
(2000) (noting that the purpose of trademark infringement action is to protect consumers
from being confused but purpose of trademark dilution action is to protect investment of
trademark owner in famous trademark).
319
Disagreement exists with regard to whether a right of publicity action is available to
everyone or only to celebrities. The leading commentator on the right to publicity
believes all people should have the right. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:3 at 205–06.
However, not all commentators agree. See id. §§ 4:14–16 at 219–26. Likewise, judicial
decisions are also split. See Curran v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:07-0354, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12479, at *14–15 (S.D.W.Va. 2008). Compare, e.g., Donchez v. Coors Brewing
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celebrity would be limited to asserting a trademark infringement or
unfair competition action based on an unauthorized confusionbased commercial transaction. This would enable a celebrity who
has invested sufficient time, energy, and money to become widely
known to the general public to protect that investment.
VI. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Courts generally disagree on the prima facie elements of a
common law right of publicity action.320 However, the leading
commentator states the following elements:
Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1220 (10th Cir. 2004) (indicating right of publicity action not
available to a non-celebrity), with KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 713, 717
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (indicating California right of publicity statute not limited to
celebrities).
320
See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir. 1996)
(stating that under California law, prima facie elements are “(1) the defendant’s use of
plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s . . . [identity] to defendant’s
advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury”);
Blair v. Nev. Landing P’ship, 859 N.E.2d 1188, 1191–92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (stating that
under Illinois law, a plaintiff must show “an appropriation of one’s name or likeness,
without one’s consent, for another’s commercial benefit”); Brasel v. The Hair Co., 976
So. 2d 390, 392 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that under Mississippi law, “a plaintiff
must show that the defendant: (1) appropriated his name or likeness, (2) without consent,
(3) for use in a commercial enterprise”); Arnold v. Treadwell, No. 283093, 2009 WL
2136909, at *4 (Ct. App. Mich. 2009) (stating that under Michigan law, “a plaintiff must
prove (1) that she has a pecuniary interest or significant commercial value in her identity,
and (2) that the defendants engaged in commercial exploitation of her identity”); Brill v.
Walt Disney Co., 246 P.3d 1099, 1102 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (stating that under
Oklahoma law, which adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition, “[o]ne who
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of privacy”); Henley v. Dillard Dept. Stores, 46 F. Supp.
2d 587, 590 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (stating that under Texas law, prima facie elements are “(1)
the defendant appropriated the plaintiff’s name or likeness for the value associated with
it, and not in an incidental manner or for a newsworthy purpose; (2) the plaintiff can be
identified from the publication; and (3) there was some advantage or benefit to the
defendant”). Likewise, the prima facie elements of a statutory right of publicity action
also vary. See, e.g., Blair, 859 N.E.2d at 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (applying the Illinois
statute which states: “[a] person may not use an individual’s identity for commercial
purposes during the individual’s lifetime without having obtained previous written
consent from the appropriate person or persons”); Molina v. Phoenix Sound Inc., 747
N.Y.S.2d 227, 230 (App. Div. 2002) (stating that under New York’s statute, a plaintiff
must show “(i) usage of plaintiff’s name, portrait, picture, or voice, (ii) with the state of
New York, (iii) for purposes of advertising or trade, (iv) without plaintiff’s written
consent”); Brill, 246 P.3d at 1103 (stating that under Oklahoma’s statute a plaintiff must
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(1) Validity Plaintiff owns an enforceable right in
the identity or persona of a human being; and
(2) Infringement
(A)
Defendant,
without
permission, has used some aspect of identity or
persona in such a way that plaintiff is identifiable
from defendant’s use; and (B) Defendant’s use is
likely to cause damage to the commercial value of
that persona.321
Typically, the third element above is presumed when some
identifiable aspect of a person’s persona is used in a commercial
context without permission.322 Usually, the traditional remedy of
injunctive relief has been available.323 Recovery of damages
generally requires proof of appropriate commercial injury.324
Generally, when the name or likeness of a celebrity is used
without permission with regard to the sale of a product or service
an unfair competition claim can also be brought.325 Under federal

establish “(1) Defendants knowingly used [plaintiff’s] name or likeness, (2) on products,
merchandise or goods, (3) without [plaintiff’s] prior consent”).
321
MCCARTHY, supra note 1 § 3:2, at 120–21.
322
Id. § 3:2, at 122.
323
Id.
324
Id. § 3:2, at 122–23. Typically, appropriate damages for a right of publicity action
are commercial in nature. For example, such damages could include the typical rate paid
to a particular celebrity for use of his or her image in an advertisement, lost licensing
opportunities, or the profits earned by an infringer. See generally id. §§ 11:30–11:35 at
751–73 (detailed discussion of damages). Nevertheless, in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978
F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992), the court noted that in an appropriate case, in addition to
commercial damages, mental distress damages as a result of causing humiliation or
embarrassment are recoverable. And, punitive damages may also be awarded. Id. at
1104–06.
325
Just as disagreement exists with regard to whether a right of publicity action is
limited to celebrities, the same issue arises with regard to whether a false endorsement
claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) is limited to celebrities. See, e.g., Uhlig LLC v.
Shirley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31833, at *19 (D. S.C. 2011) (false endorsement action
only available to celebrity). But see Arnold v. Treadwell, 642 F. Supp. 2d 723, 735 (E.D.
Mich. 2009) (celebrity status not a requirement for false endorsement action). A
trademark infringement action may also be available if the celebrity has registered their
name or other characteristic as a trademark or service mark. The elements of a trademark
infringement action are: (1) plaintiff must show ownership of the mark; and (2) consumer
confusion is likely to result from defendant’s use of the mark. Rearden LLC v. Rearden
Commerce Inc., 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2012).
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law such claims are typically referred to as false endorsement
actions326 and require the plaintiff to establish:
(1) its mark is legally protectable;
(2) it owns the mark;
(3) the defendant’s use of the mark to identify its
goods or services is likely to create confusion
concerning the plaintiff’s sponsorship or approval
of those goods or services.327
Additionally, the mark must be used in interstate commerce328
for the above action, although analogous state-based actions are
available when purely intrastate commerce is involved.329
Based on the statute330 and its judicial interpretation, the word
mark is broadly construed to include “any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof.”331 This includes
both registered and unregistered marks as well as the use of a
person’s name, likeness, or any other indicia that identifies the
person.332 Often, any unauthorized reference to a celebrity in a
commercial context will trigger a successful false endorsement
claim because such use will generally make it likely that
consumers believe the celebrity endorses or approves of the
product or service and therefore a confusion-based association will
exist.333 Of course, relying on a false endorsement action
eliminates the small number of disputes where only an
associational connection is made by consumers between the
326

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
Facenda v. Nat’l Football League, 542 F.3d 1007, 1014 (3d Cir. 2008).
328
Uhlig LLC v. Shirley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31833, at *19 (D. S.C. 2011).
329
See, e.g., Hubbs Mach. & Mfg. v. Brunson Instrument Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1016,
1019 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (stating that under Missouri law: “[u]nfair competition is a species
of commercial hitchhiking which the law finds offensive, and, therefore, prohibits. The
law of unfair competition is but a reaffirmation of the rules of fair play. It aims to effect
honesty among competitors by outlawing all attempts to trade on another’s reputation—it
gives the crop to the sower and not to the trespasser. In so doing it strives to protect the
buying public from deception”).
330
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
331
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
332
Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1014; see also Amazon, Inc. v. Cannondale Inc., No. 99 N
571, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17864, at *18–19 (D. Colo. 2000) (noting that celebrity
persona is the mark at issue in a false endorsement claim).
333
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 939 (6th Cir. 2003).
327
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product or service and the celebrity.334 Under this approach, an
unfair competition action, such as a false endorsement action, can
substitute for a right of publicity action whenever a confusionbased association is created by a commercial use of a person’s
persona.335
Commercial use of a person’s persona should typically not be
actionable if only an association-based connection exists between
the person and the product or service he or she is associated with.
This approach preserves a robust public domain where references
to celebrities and others can be made freely as long as there is no
likelihood of consumer marketplace confusion. This result
simplifies to some extent the difficulty of distinguishing between a
person’s reputational interests and First Amendment free speech
considerations since little justification exists for cloaking
misleading and confusing commercial speech with First
Amendment protection.336
However, one exception to this
limitation can be gleaned or borrowed from trademark dilution
law.
Under dilution law,337 a limited number of trademarks that are
deemed famous338 are granted an extra layer of protection.339 This
protection arises from a commercial use that creates an
association-based relationship even if no confusion-based
relationship exists.340 To be famous, the trademark must be

334

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP,
109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 143, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (denying motion for preliminary
injunction because there was insufficient information to prove false endorsement even
though there was an associational connection).
335
ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 924.
336
See generally Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 251 (Cal. 2002) (finding that
misleading or deceptive speech entitled to little of any First Amendment protection).
337
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (federal dilution). State dilution statutes also exist. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 495.151 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (2012).
338
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
339
See id.
340
See Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 143, 170
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that likelihood of confusion is not relevant in a dilution
action). Federal law makes a dilution action available “regardless of the presence or
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.” 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). Dilution actions apply to a very limited class of trademarks that
have such strong consumer associations that unauthorized non-competing uses by a third
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“widely recognized by the general consuming public.”341 If a
celebrity reaches this status, a right of publicity action should be
available even if commercial use of the celebrity persona only
creates an association-based relationship. Arguably, this provides
an extra level of legal protection for a limited number of
celebrities, just as dilution law provides an extra level of protection
for the limited number of trademarks that have attained an
unusually high level of marketplace recognition.
Admittedly, this approach will make it virtually impossible for
non-celebrities to successfully assert an action because they will be
unable to satisfy the famous requirement. They will also be
unlikely to demonstrate any likelihood of confusion as required by
an unfair competition action.342 Nevertheless, non-celebrities
would still have the option of asserting a right of privacy action in
appropriate cases to protect their personas from public humiliation
or emotional distress.
Analogizing to unfair competition and trademark law allows
courts to apply the rich body of precedent that exists in those areas
of law. This will create more certainty with regard to what are
protectable property interests and what should be freely available
in the public domain. Finally, it will allow the right of publicity to
fit within the genus of intellectual property law by applying the
same balancing of competing interests that is endemic to the other
species of intellectual property law.
CONCLUSION
The right of publicity represents the newest species of
intellectual property. However, its parameters can best be
described as a work in progress over the past several decades.
Some judicial decisions greatly expanded the right by focusing
primarily on protecting celebrities from unauthorized free riding.
This has included commercial use of a person’s name, likeness, or
anything that conjures up an association with the celebrity even if
party can negatively affect the mark’s value. See Franklin Mint Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
169–70 (quoting Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999)).
341
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
342
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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consumers would be unlikely to believe the person approved of or
endorsed the product or service involved. Other judicial decisions
recognized that the right must be balanced against competing
concerns such as promoting competition, accommodating freedom
of speech concerns, and maintaining a robust public domain
comprised of things that are free for all to use. Such balancing has
long been a part of the traditional bodies of intellectual property
law. This well-developed balancing approach should be adopted
and made applicable to the interest protected by the right of
publicity by utilizing the traditional likelihood of consumer
confusion standard applied in trademark and unfair competition
actions. This would allow right of publicity actions when a
person’s persona is used in a confusion-based commercial activity
but not when only an association-based commercial relationship is
involved. Additionally, in light of the broad scope of modern
trademark law and the broad application of unfair competition
actions, virtually any confusion-based commercial activity could
be redressed under trademark law and/or unfair competition law
using a likelihood of confusion standard in lieu of a right of
publicity action. This approach is consistent with the underlying
utilitarian justification for intellectual property law, which
primarily seeks to enlarge the public domain by incentivizing
innovators and creators by providing limited property rights for a
variety of creative products. By analogy to the rights granted to
famous trademarks pursuant to dilution theory, additional
protection for association-based commercial use of a person’s
persona should be limited to famous individuals who are widely
known by the general public.

